For citizens to make collective decisions there must be a set of political institutions and rules which determine 'who is authorised to make' those decisions and 'which procedures ought to be applied'. 4 Insofar as that power 'is authorized by the basic law of the constitution, [it] becomes a right' for all qualified citizens. 5 Thus the capacity to exercise the power to make political decisions is an entitlement recognised as a basic norm of the Constitution. There can be little doubt that the legal authorisation of participation in collective decision-making is an entitlement recognised in law. The view that the Constitution confers Sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution, read in context, require the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives to be directly chosen at periodic elections by the people of the States and of the Commonwealth respectively. 10 This principle is seen as the one indispensable requirement of modern democracies, 11 because a direct choice provides for popular control of representatives. As Gummow J explained in McGinty: 'What is necessary is the broadly identified requirement of ultimate control by the people, exercised by representatives who are elected periodically'. 12 Second, once elected, representatives alone make legislative 13 and executive 14 decisions 15 on behalf of citizens. 16 In Westminster systems like Australia's, Ministers of State exercise executive power, which is the final power of political decision. In other words, they make public policy decisions. They must also be members of Parliament, and are accountable to it. 17 As Mayo pointed out many years ago:
On the whole, no democratic system operates on the principle that voters directly decide public policies at elections. The control over policy is much more indirect -through the representatives.
18
Of course Ministers are responsive to the views of electors, since 'popular influence over policy occurs day in day out ' . 19 This influence may take different forms, such as through the popular media, community and interest groups, elites, and even state parliamentarians. Indeed the effect of popular influence and control is contemplated by the very system of responsible government. This principle, amongst other things, requires that members of the executive are responsible to Parliament and ultimately to the people, at an election. As the court in Lange explained, 'the attitudes of electors to the conduct of the Executive may be a significant determinant of the contemporary practice of responsible government'. 20 The third principle is that electors directly make policy decisions through the occasional use of referenda and plebiscites. In plebiscites, the electors are asked to vote on a question of national importance, whereas in a referendum to amend the Australian Constitution, 21 electors are asked to vote on a law that is referred to them for their final approval. 22 When voting in referendums to change the Constitution, electors make a policy choice; they exert control over the final decision whether or not to alter the Constitution. Even though the question is framed by the Federal Parliament through a referendum bill, it is not simply a choice offered to the people, but one in which they are typically engaged throughout the entire process of change. The Prime Minister and Cabinet usually initiate the constitutional change, the question to be asked is formulated and approved by the Parliament, opportunities for participation and discussion are created and, ultimately, the people are given their say. While the third principle is regarded as an exception to the second principle of participation, it is, as we have seen, more complex. There is a vital intersection between representative and referendum democracy. The Parliament proposes and the electors decide.
The right to participate, expressed as three principles, helps us understand that the Constitution provides legal entitlements to participate in collective decisions. There are also more specific rights and limitations recognised in the Constitution and legislation.
The democratic rights
The so-called democratic rights or the 'rights of representatives' 23 were developed through struggles over several centuries, but crystallised in the 19th century, in the well-known Chartist movement in the United Kingdom.
24 Their Charter had six basic points that were included in petitions to the UK Parliament The sixth point of the Charter, demanding annual elections to Parliament, was never implemented in the United Kingdom; nor has it been implemented in Australia. But the requirement for periodic elections has endured and reflects the view that representatives should be regularly accountable to the electorate.
The Chartist movement influenced the development of colonial democracy in Australia and the British Empire. As Justice Crennan explained in an extrajudicial speech, the struggle for 'full and fair representation', especially relating to manhood suffrage, became what is known as the 'imperial framework' and 'reveals the values which lie behind, and are expressed in the Constitution, in the phrase "directly chosen by the people"'.
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As noted, the first five points demanded by the Chartists are now included in either Australian electoral legislation or the Australian Constitution, and in UK electoral legislation. They are concerned with the authorisation of those who are to make collective decisions, providing who shall choose and be chosen as representatives (according to the universal franchise), how they shall be chosen (through a secret ballot from electorates of equal size), and with removing limits on that choice based on property and wealth qualifications. Overall, the law authorises the whole people to participate in making collective decisions and confers legal rights 'to participate directly or indirectly in the making' of those decisions. 30 But more is required for democracy to function. freedoms of speech, association and assembly. 32 These freedoms draw on the philosophical tradition of the inviolable rights of the individual, as expressed in the French and American revolutions and in contemporary human rights movements. Whatever be their philosophical justifications, though, these freedoms are regarded as the necessary preconditions for the predominantly procedural rules of democracy to function effectively. 33 These freedoms form the basis not only of the liberal state, but also of the democratic state, and when 'political liberties and the legitimate opposition are gone, so, too, is democracy'.
Fundamental freedoms

34
In sum, these procedural rules are regarded as the preconditions for the game, not the game itself. 35 What, then, is the game? The game is the elite competition for power which occurs in Western representative democracies. The competition takes place not only during elections, of course, but through the whole term of the Parliament. Representative democracy is by definition elite, confined to only the small number of individuals who are elected as representatives. The game itself also imposes responsibilities for representatives in a democracy.
Responsibilities of representatives
Mayo recognises three responsibilities as forming the rules of the game for representatives. 36 First, the government, formed by the majority of representatives, makes its policy decisions subject to the existence of the fundamental freedoms. These freedoms limit the capacity of the government to silence the opposition, the critics and those who dissent. It is axiomatic that in Western democracy there is a government and there is an opposition. Political liberties may not be removed by the government within or outside Parliament. This does not mean that governments may not coerce the opposition into obedience to law, nor ill-treat their opponents. Rather, the fundamental freedoms guarantee the opportunity for the opposition and the dissenters to be heard, to protest and to organise. 37 Thus this rule is an inhibition on majority rule.
Second, the opposition will obey the law, even though it might be difficult because the law is disliked. 38 While obeying the law, oppositions habitually work to change the policy and ultimately to change the government and become 32 a majority -but only by peaceful means. 39 Third, when there is a change of government the new government is subject to the same fundamental freedoms and the new opposition is bound by the same obligations. 40 As Mayo explains, '[t]he minority also agrees beforehand that they, too, will extend the same political freedoms and follow the same rules of the game should they arrive in the seats of office'. 41 The game continues again, with new actors and office holders, according to these rules.
These responsibilities are regarded as necessary for the continuity of democracy. There are of course other social conditions necessary for the peaceful transfer of power and functioning of democracy. 42 However, as Mayo says, these three rules represent the 'formal conditions' necessary to be met 'for majorities and minorities in the legislature if democracy is to work at all'. 43 Mayo regards these rules respectively as an inhibition, an obligation and an agreement. In constitutional discourse they would be regarded as constitutional practices or traditions. These responsibilities can also be implied from the express constitutional provisions authorising representatives to make legislative and executive decisions. As these responsibilities may be implied from the text of the Constitution, each may be regarded as a constitutional obligation.
44
Recognition in law of the rules for collective decision-making I have examined the right to participate in collective decision-making by explaining the key legal rules, principles and norms upon which the right rests. These provide who is authorised to make collective decisions and the procedures to be applied. But how, you might ask, are these rules recognised in law? In passing, I have already briefly indicated how these rules are acknowledged in law, but some further explanation is required. I address this topic in two ways: first, by briefly analysing how the rules for making collective decisions are recognised in traditional sources of law such as the Constitution, constitutional conventions and legislation; and second, by examining how legislative rights are recognised and may become protected by the Constitution. Recognition in traditional sources of law of the rules for collective decision-making Democratic rights and freedoms are protected by the juridical state. This is the state which is governed not only sub lege -or under law -but also according to constitutional limits. 45 The right to participate and the 'democratic rights' of representatives may be inferred from express provisions in the Constitution. Some are imposed as institutional obligations on the legislature: 'There shall be a session of the Parliament once at least in every year', for example. 46 Others are expressed as rights of representatives: 'each member and senator … shall receive an allowance of', 47 and each member and senator 'shall have one vote', and 'questions arising … shall be determined by a majority of votes' in the respective houses of Parliament.
48 Some are expressed as individual rights and freedoms. The fundamental freedoms are typically recognised in constitutional bills of rights and statutory charters.
The rule that legislation must be passed subject to the fundamental freedoms receives explicit recognition where there is a statutory or constitutional bill of rights. 49 In Australia, at the federal level, where there is no constitutional bill of rights, freedom of political communication has now been recognised as an implied limit under the Constitution. The freedom confers an immunity from the operation of legislative and executive power. 50 Other fundamental freedoms may also be recognised by the High Court.
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The responsibilities for representatives have for a long time been regarded as rules of political practice, and might be regarded as constitutional conventions. These are traditions, not rules of law. 52 They enable the words of the Constitution to be understood in the context of rules induced from political practice. The conventions are principally concerned with the relationship between the Prime Minister, the Ministers and the Governor-General. 53 The responsibilities for 55 In this case the question was whether or not the rules of natural justice applied to the Governor in Council. Gibbs CJ relied on the constitutional convention of responsible government to apply the rules of natural justice. His argument ran this way: the Governor in Council must act on the advice of Ministers, who are subject to the rules of natural justice. Therefore the rules of natural justice apply to the Governor in Council in exercising a statutory function. There was also no reason why the Governor in Council should not be subject to the rules of natural justice. 56 Similarly, the principle of responsible government requires that the government be formed by the party which has the confidence of a majority of members in the lower house of Parliament. If there is to be a new majority or the majority is to be tested, the government must respect the conditions which allow a new majority to be formed. Accordingly, members of Parliament are subject to the responsibilities of representatives to obey the law and make decisions subject to the fundamental freedoms.
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Constitutional conventions are political practices or traditions subject only to political pressure. There is a difference in attitude towards conventions in Australia and Britain. For example, Marshall notes that 'the most obvious and undisputed convention of the British constitutional system is that Parliament does not use its unlimited powers of legislation in an oppressive and tyrannical way'. 58 In this way conventions act as an inhibition on the conduct of representatives in the United Kingdom. By contrast, in Australia such a convention has not always been followed. Conventions may be overridden by legislation, as they are not principles of law. Laws which have sought to restrict freedom of association have been passed at both the Whether or not Mayo's responsibilities of representatives are now recognised as conventions, some judges have recognised elements of the responsibilities of representation, though not the responsibilities themselves. Their Honours have focused on the words in ss 7 and 24 that require a direct choice by the people of senators and members (respectively) as imposing limits on the legislature and the government. Accordingly, the legislature and government may not limit a free choice among the available candidates in an election, nor the freedom of political communication.
Several High Court decisions illustrate the scope of these limits. In describing the constitutional system of representative government, the High Court in Lange observed that 'the elections to [the Parliament] must be free, with all that this implies in the way of freedom of speech and political organisation'. 61 In Mulholland, Gleeson CJ maintained that the choice required by the Constitution is a true choice with 'an opportunity to gain an appre ciation of the available alternatives' and that a ballot paper that discriminated in favour of a government candidate 'might so distort the process of choice as to fail to satisfy the test' laid down in the Constitution.
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In Langer, the High Court upheld the system of full preferential voting, 63 where voters number their ballot paper sequentially in accordance with their preference for candidates. Brennan CJ affirmed the validity of preferential voting on the grounds that it provided 'a method of freely choosing members of the House of Representatives' from amongst the available alternatives and 'permits a voter to make a discriminating choice among the candidates for election to the House of Representatives'. 64 In sum, the rules for making collective decisions are to be found in a variety of legal sources, including the Constitution and legislation. Some political practices have not yet been recognised as constitutional conventions, whilst other legal rules have not been fully developed.
Legislative rights recognised and protected as constitutional rights the Australian Constitution or in electoral legislation. There is contention over whether the rights are merely recognised in legislation, or may also now be protected by the Constitution.
This issue arose in relation to the Commonwealth Electoral Act's regulation of electorate sizes. The argument that ss 7 and 24 requiring a direct choice by the people requires equal electoral sizes in Commonwealth legislation was rejected by a majority of the High Court in McKinlay. 65 At best, some judges in McKinlay and McGinty 66 made obiter dicta statements that these provisions prohibit gross disparities in electorate size or other forms of electoral inequality. At some point such disparities could not be regarded as a direct choice by the people. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Electoral Act now requires equality of electorate sizes, plus or minus ten per cent. 67 More recently, members of the High Court have referred to a constitutional protection of the right to vote and participate in the political life of the community. The constitutional protection of the right to vote has been controversial. Professor Twomey, relying on Kiefel J in Rowe, has argued that ss 7 and 24 do not give rise to a personal right to vote. 68 Professors Blackshield and Williams maintain that the requirement for a direct choice of representatives by the people in ss 7 and 24 arguably supports an implied right to vote. 69 In this part, I briefly address two questions in relation to this controversy. First, what form of constitutional protection has been accorded to the right to vote by a majority of the High Court? Second, what is the relationship between the constitutional protection and legislation?
The Federal Parliament has enacted the franchise, which refers to a statutory right to vote. The Parliament has a plenary constitutional power to enact laws for elections and for the qualifications of electors. 70 The first federal electoral act provided a franchise for all adult male and female persons qualified to vote. 71 were not removed until the early 1960s. 73 The universal franchise now means that the legislative right to vote is conferred without restrictions based on race, gender and property. It was not until the 21st century that the High Court decided whether or not the Constitution protected the universal franchise.
The recognition of constitutional protection of the right to vote was accepted by Gleeson CJ in Roach 74 and French CJ, Gummow, Crennan and Bell JJ in Rowe. In Roach the High Court considered a challenge to legislation that banned all prisoners voting.
In Roach, the Chief Justice concluded 'that ... the words of ss 7 and 24, because of changed historical circumstances including legislative history, have come to be a constitutional protection of the right to vote'. 75 His Honour drew on the philosophy of the universal franchise to define the meaning of the right to participate in the political life of the community: 76 Because the franchise is critical to representative government, and lies at the centre of our concept of participation in the life of the community, and of citizenship, disenfranchisement of any group of adult citizens on a basis that does not constitute a substantial reason for exclusion from such participation would not be consistent with choice by the people.
He accepted that a substantial reason required 'a rational connection with the identification of community membership or with the capacity to exercise free choice'. 77 In this case, his Honour concluded that the legislative ban on all prisoners voting was arbitrary because it did not distinguish non-serious from serious offences; only serious offences would warrant disenfranchisement. 78 He noted that the rationale for 'the exclusion from the franchise' must be 'related to the right to participate in political membership of the community'. 79 Chief Justice Gleeson expressly referred to this right, defined broadly, regarding it as protecting the right to vote, which is one of the political rights of citizenship, which in turn provides for full membership of the community. His focus in the 'Since what is involved is not an additional form of punishment, and since deprivation of the franchise takes away a right associated with citizenship, that is, with full membership of the community, the rationale for the exclusion must be that serious offending represents such a form of civic irresponsibility that it is appropriate for Parliament (177) to mark such behaviour as anti-social and to direct that physical separation from the community will be accompanied by symbolic separation in the form of loss of a fundamental political right.' judgment, though, was on the right to participate as protecting the right to vote, which he regarded as a fundamental right. However, the Chief Justice's acceptance of the constitutional protection of the right to vote was not adopted by the other judges in Roach.
In Rowe, the existence of the right to vote was again considered by the High Court. In dissent, Kiefel J argued that ss 7 and 24 did not give rise to a personal right to vote. Her Honour construed the view of Gleeson CJ as a reference to 'an incident of universal adult suffrage, rather than an individualised view of "the franchise"'. 80 However, none of the majority judgments in Rowe adopted her approach. In fact, Chief Justice Gleeson's reference to the 'Constitutional protection of the right to vote' was quoted with approval by four judgesFrench CJ, Crennan, Gummow and Bell JJ. 81 Moreover, each advanced their own distinct understanding of the constitutional protection of the right.
French CJ recognised that ss 7 and 24 conferred rights on the whole people of the Commonwealth. This is because the right to vote was of concern to all the people 82 and individual voting rights and duties to enrol are made in aid of a direct choice, required by ss 7 and 24. 83 Chief Justice French quoted Gleeson CJ's views to justify the irreversible evolution of 'chosen by the people' as protecting the universal adult-citizen franchise. Justices Gummow and Bell noted that legislative development always was to be overseen by the imperative of popular choice found in ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution … One result is explained in the following passage from the reasons of Gleeson The 'rights' conferred by the section are given to 'the people of the Commonwealth' -not individuals, although by necessary implication a member of the public may bring an action to declare void legislation that is contrary to the terms of s 24 or what is necessarily implied by it. Whether or not a member has been 'chosen by the people' depends on a judgment, based on the common understanding of the time, as to whether the people as a class have elected the member. It does not depend on the concrete wishes or desires of individual electors.
Thus a person has a legal entitlement to enforce the public right. Presumably they are acting as representatives of the people of the Commonwealth. However, the right to vote is only conferred on individual persons as members of 'the people'. It is only a right exercised by the people as a class. Due to this complexity the distinction between personal and public right may prove difficult to discern in theory and application. While Justice Gray provided a persuasive opinion, he omitted to quote directly from Chief Justice Gleeson in Roach. His honour preferred Justice Kiefel's characterisation in Rowe of the Chief Justice's approach. Thus Gleeson CJ's justifications relied on by the majority in Rowe were not fully explored in Holmdahl. 90 The precise nature of the constitutional protection of the right to vote remains contentious. But there is now, at least, clear judicial support for a constitutional protection of the right to vote.
The judgments of the majority in Rowe are of significance to the emergence of an interpretive relationship between the Constitution and longstanding legislation. The High Court's discussion of the relationship is of particular importance to an understanding of the regulatory limits of the Constitution. The aspects of that relationship that will be considered are the effect of the Constitution on legislation and the effect of legislation upon the Constitution. attention will be given to the idea of 'permeability' between the Constitution and legislation: the use of constitutional principles as interpretive tools for the direct or indirect protection of rights under legislation and the applicability of legislative provisions as normative principles to enhance the constitutionally prescribed system of representative and responsible government. 91 My inquiry will focus upon the openness and potential flow of normative principles between the Constitution and legislation. It is important to note that while there is a permeability between these two instruments, the Constitution is supreme law and is not in any way dependent for its authority upon legislation. The possibility for an interpretation that strengthens the right to vote will be emphasised.
A legislative limit on the implied right to participate was at issue in Rowe, where the Court considered an amendment to the enrolment procedures. 92 Since 1983, Commonwealth legislation provided that after the election was called, there would be a grace period of seven days to enrol for the first time, or to transfer enrolment if a person had changed their address. In 2006, legislation removed the grace period for new enrolments entirely, and reduced the period to three days for transfer of enrolments. 93 The Electoral Commission estimated that reinstatement of the seven day grace period might affect approximately 100,000 people who lodged claims in the seven day period after the writs were issued. A majority in Rowe held that the amendment was invalid.
Effect of the Constitution on legislation
Four justices 94 accepted that the right to vote was protected by the Constitution and regarded it as a limit on the legislative power of the Commonwealth. Chief Justice French held that the Australian Electoral Act provisions for grace periods of seven days for enrolment and 3 days for transfer of enrolment could not be restricted due to the 'collateral damage to the extent of participation by qualified persons'. 95 Even though some people failed to fulfil their duties under the Act, limiting their own opportunities, the damage was still a detriment 'of concern to the whole Commonwealth'. 96 In sum, he saw the legal effect of the amendment as diminishing the opportunities for enrolment and transfer of enrolment that existed prior to their enactment.
Justices Gummow and Bell believed the method of choice adopted by the legislative amendment failed as a means to what should be the end; that is, making elections as expressive of popular choice as practical considerations properly permit -popular choice being guaranteed by ss 7 and 24. 97 They maintained that '[t]he position then is reached that the 2006 Act has the practical operation of effecting a legislative disqualification from what otherwise is the popular choice mandated by the Constitution.'
98 Their Honours also adopted a substantive view of the right, rejecting the argument of the Commonwealth that enrolment was merely a procedure, because it affected the rights of electors.
Justice Crennan accepted that 'the centrality of the franchise, to a citizen's participation in the life of the community and membership of the Australian body politic, was recognised in Roach'.
99 Her Honour also maintained that 'persons' had a 'right to participate in choosing parliamentary representatives', against which her Honour assessed the challenged legislation. 100 She said:
It can be accepted that the impugned provisions … operate to disentitle or exclude persons (otherwise legally eligible) from the right to vote and the right to participate in choosing parliamentary representatives for the State and Subdivision in which they reside. It can also be accepted that achieving and maintaining Electoral Rolls of integrity is a purpose which is compatible with ss 7 and 24.
Her Honour held that the Amendment Act was not appropriate or necessary to protect the integrity of the Electoral Rolls. Moreover, 'to seek to discourage a surge of late claims for enrolment by disentitling or excluding those making them [under the Amendment Act] constitutes a failure to recognise the centrality of the franchise to a citizen's participation in the political life of the community'.
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Thus their Honours recognise three different norms protecting participation and voting. The franchise may not be limited in a way that is detrimental or damaging to participation by 'qualified persons', 102 or by 'disqualifying', 'disentitling' or 'excluding' of citizens, and should enhance the popular choice to participate in elections to the maximum extent that is practical. in Rowe offer approaches that may see further democratic legislative rights protected. However, it is notable that the protection given by the majority to the right to vote pertained to the denial of individuals' opportunities to participate in an election. Not all voting methods may attract such protection: compulsory or preferential voting, which are concerned with Parliament's choice of electoral system, are one example.
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Conclusion
The High Court has now recognised a constitutional protection of the right to vote and participate in the political life of the community. The permeability of norms between the Constitution and legislation helps us better understand the nature and scope of that right. However, it has been argued that there is a broader conception of the right to participate in collective decisions which is recognised in constitutional principles, augmented by legislation and possibly constitutional conventions. This includes participation in legislative and executive decisions, not just voting in elections. Whether or not this broader right is recognised by the courts, it will remain of the utmost significance to the practice and proper functioning of Australian constitutional democracy.
